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1984 has witnessed an intensification of the world economic 
crisis wnicn began 10 years ago and with it a heightening of 
the class struggle world-wide. So extreme has the recession 
become that banner headlines liken it countless times to the 
first capitalist crash of 1929. Not even the USA's 
con^unctural boom can act as any respite to its own working 
population or to those of the ocher nations linked 
inexoraoly in the Imperialist chain. In America capitalism 
can boast an increase in profits of up to 50% for 1984 and 
the truth is that this has Deen achieved by depressing the 
value of wages below the inflation rate since 1981.
For Latin America, America's boom has brought nothing but 
greater hardship as she reels under the economic burden of 
increased indebtedness, exacerbated by the soaring interest 
rates in the USA.
Caring little for traditional blood-ties America intensifies 
the death throes of her oldest rival - Britain. The buoyant 
dollar has suppressed confidence in sterling, pushing up the 
cost of credit and thus discouraging capitalists from 
investing. The threat of this ruthless business sense has 
expressed itself in the most tenacious struggles on the part 
of workers to defend tneir right to work.
In South Africa, hopes of an export-lea recovery have been 
shattered by greatly diminished exports from the drought 
striken agricultural sector, and the costly importation of 
neavy machinery from America and Japan where the rand finds 
very little in exchange.
This then is the meaning of America's boom. In a period of 
rapidly declining capitalism, there can be no talk of a 
protracted boom wnicn brings aoout general social 
upliftment, but only an i n t e n s i fication of the most 
nationalisic throat-cutting and the immiseration of large 
sections of the working class.
It is this scenario of impending degeneration which has 
inspired the wave of political conservatism that is sweeping 
over tne world. It expresses itself most clearly in the 
Reagan and Thatcher regimes and of course in the repressive 
rule of their junior partners in Latin America, 
fui.ica duu cue niuuie tast. it is tne unanimous tear for the 
collapse of their outdated, parasitic system which drives 
the Imperialist armies to defend more viciously their 
"strategic areas", to support reactionary forces and 
governments in a bid to topple populist governments, and to 
crush the struggle of workers and their organisations by the 
"rule of law". In’this period of convulsive class struggle 
democracy is unmasked for what it is - the dictatorship of 
the exploiters.
But let not gloom and defeatism be the only impressions 
gleaned from our present juncture. A reexamination of the 
same scenario is quick to reveal its progressive otner side. 
It rests in the signal fact tnat despite the growing fascism 
of their rulers, or p r e cisely because of it, workers 
everywhere are entering the political arena with renewed 
militancy and yearning for solidarity to take on the life 
and deatn struggles against tneir intensified exploitation 
and oppression frontally. Witness the protracted struggles 
of British and German workers against encroaching 
unemployment, the South American general strikes against 
intensified Imperialist indebtedness, and locally the two- 
day stay-away of naif a million workers against the use of 
the army to quell struggles against exorbitant rent 
i ncreases,
In the midst of this renewed zest for united defence against 
the ravages of a dying capitalist system stands a leadership 
crippled by cowardly economists and open reformism. In Europe 
there are tnose wno, having lost all hope in the ability of 
the working class to lead a determined battle against 
exploitation and oppression, seek out pockets of petit 
bourgeois radicalism instead. And the trade unions which do 
organise workers never depart from narrow economism, tnereby 
ensuring that the intensely political nature of class 
struggle in this period is diffused.
The South African variants display no greater appreciation 
of the convulsive nature of tne class struggle at this 
juncture and the consequent need to revise "peacetime" 
tactics and organisational forms. Instead of boldly 
asserting the need for a workers united front as the best 
oraanisational form to express tne growing desire of a !• 
workers for united defence of their sharply declining living 
standards, progressive trade unions are crippled by a 
cowardly economism. This position ignores the aspirations of 
the entire working class in order to protect the mere 10% of 
unionised workers through the most passive and reformist 
means available - appeals to liberal bosses and embassies to 
pressurise their more conservative brethren and tne almost 
exclusive reliance on tne state's Industrial Conciliation 
machinery to solve factory floor disputes.
Outside of the trade union mov e m e n t ,  the ODE has 
nostalgically resorted to the tactics of the protest era of 
the '50's starting with the signature campaign against the 
New Deal, riding an incidental high in the Vaai triangle 
uprisings and initiating an adventurist two-day bus boycott 
in the Western Cape. Nc attempt has been made to weld 
workers into an independent ana unified bastion, against the 
bludgeon of decaying capitalism.
Centrist sections within the Cape Action League, while
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paving l i p -service to the need for working class 
independence and leadership argue that the economic crisis 
merely e x acerbates the inherent o p p r e s s i v e s n e s s  of 
'apartheid capitalism'. They therefore doggedly refuse to 
see how serious a premium the economic crisis places on the 
building of the Workers United Front as the means to combat 
the oppressiveness of capitalism in decay and of ensuring 
the defence, independence and solidarity of the one class 
that can save mankind from impending disaster.
Clearly, these are serious but challenging times. They 
d e m a n d  of all organis a t i o n s  and a c t i v i s t s  ge n u i n e l y  
interested in the leadership of the working class to revise 
old methods of struggle and normal organisational forms. In 
the four issues of the Worker Tenant to date, we have 
consistently raised the salient political problems of our 
day to create a forum for the deoate of the monumental tasks 
which face workers' organisations. It is with dismay that we 
note the silence whicn has attended eacn issue and the 
paucity of vocalised criticism directed mainly at th§ 
vitriolic style. The struggle to achieve a non-exploitative 
democracy in South Africa is not going to be achieved by an 
agreement between gentlemen of the "liberatory movement" but 
by an intense struggle between exploiters and the exploited 
during which our programmes, propaganda, slogans and demands 
ultimately express the interests of one of the two combatant 
classes. No matter whicn way we look at it, no matter how 
clever the phraseology there is no comfortable third option 
ana hence the necessity for the vitriol.
It is incumbent upon all organisations of the exploited and 
oppressed, especially in these challenging times, to drop 
stances of theoretical and practical sectarianism and to pin 
tneir colours boldly to the mast for the harshest public 
critisism. Only in this way can we develop, through 
practical and theoretical struggle, a leadership that will 
hasten the triumph of tne working class in its creation of a 
progressive social order.
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South Africa
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
in Crisis: nv- r*
:<o in te rs  or. ti.e wav tor.-;*.!*: •
The S.A. economy is in the grip of a particularly severe 
economic crisis, as indeed the entire world economy is. The 
international economic chaos is amply reflected in the Third 
World debt problem, which threatens the entire international 
financial system with collapse, the fluctuating gold price, 
highly unstable interest rates, panic selling and buying on 
the world stock markests, and leading capitalist countries 
like America's balance of payment problems. Ail these fac­
tors, to a greater or lesser degree, are an expression of 
the objective and contradictory laws of capitalist develop­
ment themselves.
In South Africa, the economic crisis, or the crisis of 
capitalist accumulation for that is what it is, an inability 
to continue maki-ng profits - reflects itself in the sea of 
debt, company liquidations, a rocketing cost cf living, the 
ever growing army of unemployed, and a falling rand. This 
situation has called forth from the bloated jowls of the 
well-fed, talk about "crisis management" and a "tightening 
of belts". What does this mean? It means nothing less than 
the headlong hurl into pauperism for the bulk cf the popul­
ation the working class. The bouraeosie, as a stay of its 
own execution, has shifted the full weight of the crisis of 
capital accumulation onto the shoulders cf the working 
class. Via spiralling prices, driving down wages and exten­
ding the working day, the bourgeoisie keeps itself from 
ruin.
For the working class, this has meant increasing poverty and 
want, growing unemployment (and as a result crime} prostitu­
tion, alcoholism and the general break up of family life. 
But workers have not been slow to engage the challenge of 
the ruling class. The rapid growth of the independent trade 
union movement, in the face of severe repression, the 
increasing number of strikes and the countless rent 
struggles, bus boycotts and squatter resistance conducted 
around the country all bear abundant testimony to this.
THE POLITICAL CRISIS
The economic crisis and the vehement response it has evoked 
from the working class has created a political crisis of 
unprecedented proportion for the ruling class in South 
Africa. The reproduction of the existing profit-making eco­
nomic system is impossible unless capitalist social 
relations are reproduced. This means that a large degree of 
social stability is needed for the continued exploitation of
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workers and accumulation of capital. In the epoch of 
Monopoly Capitalism, characterised as it is by a highly 
technical and sophisticated labour process, 'this "stability” 
becomes all the more important, for it requires a "settled" 
working class which can thus acquire the levels of skill 
required in production.
The State, via the juridical system which is designed to 
protect "private" property, the police which enforce these 
laws, and, of course the jackboot of the army, aimed as it 
is at the working class, plays no small role in the 
reproduction of the capitalist social relations. The events 
of 1976 and 1980, the "liberated zones" of Masinga and 
Soweto, the recent Vaai triangle struggles and the massive 
worker stayaway last month, to name but a few examples, have 
made it clear that the ruling class is facing serious chal­
lenges to its "peaceful" rule.
The heart of the political crisis facing the ruling class is 
how to guarantee the social conditions necessary for the 
continued accumulation of capital. Thus, the. crisis of 
capital accumulation, arising out of the objective laws of 
capitalist development themselves, in the process of class 
struggle, gives rise to and is compounded by a political 
crisis, since the bourgeoisie, in response to militant 
struggles waged by the working class, can no longer hold 
society together, can no longer effectively wield power.
THE 'NEW DEAL1 BRIDGE TO FASCISM
By the very nature of the problem, the state now has to find 
layers from among the oppressed and exploited whom it can 
co-opt into the service of the ruling class. Hence the "New 
Deal". Despite its appearance as an extension of bourgeois 
democratic rights, the New Deal, through the creation of an 
Executive State President represents a dimunition of 
bougeois democratic rights. Formal power has shifted from 
the hands of the bourgeois parliament into the hands of a 
dictator. This move towards Fascism is designed essentially 
to crush working class struggle. It is the rear-guard action 
of a frightened bourgeoisie, and must ultimately be seen.as 
a defensive strategy.
The uncertainty and lack of confidence that marks the bour­
geoisie at this point is best illustrated by the vasci n a ­
tions of the PFP..This, the more far-sighted, liberal, 
section of the bourgeoisie seriously considered joining the 
UDF when the latter first emerged. The decision not to do so 
was dictated by a fear of the grounds well of militant 
struggle which the UDF potentially (and unintentionally) 
could unleash. (We will examine later why this keenness on 
the UDF). Now, in an attempt to remain within the main­
stream of political development, the liberal bourgeosie, in 
a pathetic gesture, has opened the doors of its party to all
While the state has found ready class allies in the 
Hendrickses and Reddies, this alliance must not be viewed as 
given for all times. The co-opted sections of the black 
middle class view the "New Deal" as a new opportunity for 
capital accumulation, very much in the way that the petty 
bourgeois Afrikaner nationalists viewed control cf the State- 
apparatus as a means to greater wealth. The difference 
though, is that the Afrikaner nationalists gained control cf 
the State apparatus at a time when the world economy was set 
for a prolonged period of boom. The pickings were thus more 
plentiful.
Today, the situation is entirely different. Tne money, quite 
simply, is just not there. The Soutn African state, techni­
cally, is really quite bankrupt. While the international 
bourgeoisie has been prepared to prop it up to the tune of 
RS2 billion in loans, this is clearly not enough to sustain 
the huge bureaucracy that has grown up, in addition to the 
"normal" state expenditure on infrastructure and social 
services. Already the social security services are breaking 
down. In the littie town of Hanover, in the Little Karoo, a 
bare seven hours drive from Cape Town, the cash for pensions 
ran out before the last pensioner has reached the casmer. 
The economic crisis and its effects on the state can also be 
seen in the complete collapse of the influx control system. 
The high degree of bureaucracy, the constant monitoring of 
"illegal" urbanisation and its great cost have become a 
burden to the state.
The Hendrickses and Reddies will therefore have to be 
content with their annual salaries. Whether they will, and 
wnat form their disillusionment will take, remains to be 
seen. Even the acceptable bourgeois practice of jobs-for- 
pals will be difficult to effect. Already the whites-only 
Public Servants Association, has been making ominous noises 
about not entertaining threats to their jobs.Over and above 
these considerations, it must be borne in mind that Monopoly 
Capitalism, is characterised by the tight control of produc­
tion and distribution in increasingly fewer hands. The 
effect of this is the squeezing out of the middle class, the 
petty bourgeoisie. Under conditions of crisis and decline, 
this process becomes telescoped, and any thought of buiIdi ng 
a sizeable black middle class, which in recent years the 
State has been attempting to do, becomes mere wishful 
thinking. Even Botha himself has openly lamented the failure 
of the State to introduce the New Deal under earlier, more 
prosperous conditions.
So, in addition to working class opposition to the New Deal, 
which has been clearly demonstrated, the State is faced with 
the added concern of its new-found juniour partners asking 
for more than the budget can manage, thereby threatening the 
present honeymoon.
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A NATIONAL CONVENTION
But should the "New Deal" for a combination of these 
factors, come unstuck, what options has tne bourgeoisie? 
here the PFP comes into its own. For a few years now it has 
been catling for a National Convention, and tne release of 
Nelson Mandela. In recent months it has become clear that 
the State is now seriously pursuing this option. Nationalist 
MBs and Cabinet Ministers have hinted ever so coyly at this 
possibility, and the need, at some point, to “talk" to ANC. 
Nor has it remained simply at the level Of rhetoric; the 
unbanning of the Freedom Charter, and the offer of freedom 
to Mandela, albeit a qualified offer, must be viewed in the 
context of preparing the ground, so to speak. The National 
Convention is of course the option which the international 
bourgeoisie best favours.
What does the PFP, the State or the international bourgeoi­
sie mean by a National Convention? Does it differ from what 
the Populists mean when they call for a National Convention? 
Unfortunately not. This is only too well understood by all 
the above parties. The National Convention will be convened 
by the State, the agent of the Bourgeoisie, and to it will 
be invited the "legitimate" leaders of the people, 
democratically despatched from London and aobben Island, 
there to do a deal whereby they will take the place of the 
present incumbents of the juniourpartner jobs.
From the National Convention argue its proponents, will flow 
the democratization of capitalism ir. South Africa, With the 
coming to power of the "people" the apartheid system would 
be dismantled and full democratic rights such as universal 
franchise, freedom of movement, the right to own land etc 
would be extended to the exploited and oppressed. "Free 
enterprise" would then blossom unfettered. But this yearning 
of the international bourgeoisie, liberal sections of che 
South African ruling class and the oppressed petit- 
bourgeoisie for the halcyon days of democratic capitalism is 
anachronistic. Increasingly the degeneration of the present 
economic system is forcing the ruling class the world over 
to backpedal frantically on their traditions of bourgeois 
democracy. To protect their falling profits bosses seek more 
intensive methods of exploiting workers and cheaper ways of 
reproducing them. To do so requires a direct attack on the 
ability and freedom of the working class to organise in its 
own defence - le. to make inroads into the very foundations 
of bourgeois democracy. In the grips of severe economic 
cisis Britain and the USA have spawned Thatcherism and 
Reagamsm as the conservative or ideas towards fascism.
Under these conditions the less advanced capitalist 
countries of ‘'sub-imperialist' and 'Third World* states are 
even less capable of ensuring "peace and Stability" along 
the lines of bourgeois democracy. As tne experience of 
'liberation' in Zimbabwe so glaringly reveals, the
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establishment of the formal parliament •. ry trappings of demo­
cracy are contradicted tenfold / tuncsamencal attacks on the 
living standards and democratic gains of the exploited. 
Just as tae so-called “New Deal" was stili-aorn, so an 
apartheic-free capitalise will ee extremely unstable from 
its mention. Whatever the good intentions of reformists, 
they will amount to nought in the face of the necessity for 
taci:ning caitalism to bolster itself at cne economic and 
political expense of the working class. I r. short the 
National Convention will amount to a criminal betrayal of 
the working class in its struggle for a democratic South 
Africa free from exploitation ar.d oppression.
The State will convene the National Convention as a last 
resort though, The other option it has, and which it may 
well settle for, is Fascism. We see the seeds of this 
already in the Executive State President with dictatorial 
cower. We will discuss the prospects of the emergence of 
Fascism below.
THE OPTIONS FACING THE OPPRESSED MIDDLE CLASS
The drive towards the National Convention is of course 
propelled by the black petit-bourgeois populists. The 
guerilla struggle is designed exclusively to this end. Sot 
the economic and political crisis has also severely affected 
our petit-bourgeoisie. The rocketing cost of living nas 
threatened many a petit-bourgeois with the prospect of being 
hurled into the ranks of the working class.
The economic, social and political insecurity which this 
class experiences generally under Monopoly Capitalism, com­
pounded for the clack p.h, by its severe oppression in S.A., 
is multiplied one Hundred fold under conditions of crisis. 
The p.b. is left bewildered and frightened, its response 
reflects itself in the UDF and National Forum. The UDF, 
particularly, now becomes a further lever in pressurising 
the State into doing a deal.
A large element of the fright of the p.o. derives from the 
escalating militancy with which the working class is pre­
pared to enter struggle. The clack petit-bourgeoisie under­
stands the tnreat to its class position in this militancy of 
the working class, as well as does the bourgeoisie to its 
own position. This fear of the working class is best 
illustrated by the anti-election campaign. While of late 
there has beer, much talk of the working class its special 
role in the struggles, the single most characteristic 
feature of the campaign was the marked lack of involvement 
of the working class. The petit-bourgeois populists fear 
that should they mobilise the working class on an 
significant scale, they might not be able to contain an 
suppress the militancy of that class. Since the objective o 
the Populists is net the complete eradication o
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•orking class -cruggle for fundamental social change would 
■a counter-pr .uctive. Thus, in plat- of large mass mobili­
sation of M e  working class, we find instead a deliberate 
and barren nostalgia emanating from the ranks of the 
Populists. The O'OF from the outset, nas attempted to dress 
i tseit up with the mantle of past "victories". This is 
r thing more than a transparent attempt to mask its 
bancroptcy. To be sure, the Populists will use working class 
struggle to rally support for itself, out it will do so from 
a safe distance, and with the sole purpose of further pres­
surising the State, in the same manner as its signature 
campaign and other publicity stunts are supposed to do.
The black p.b. has one of two options. It can go either the 
way the Hendrickses and Reddies, and the Populists are, that 
is, become willing partners in providing capitalism in s.A. 
with a new lease of life. The economic and social position 
of the p.b. is steadiiiy deteriorating. It must begin to see 
that only a strong working class can champion its causes of 
debt, housing shortages, escalating costs and so on. It will
mean for the p.b. a complete subsuming of their class
interests to those of the working class. The key in this
process is a strong working class which * i 11 show itself
capable of solving the present problems con ironting S.A.
society a whole.
THE GROWING MILITANCY OF THE WORKING CLASS
What then of the working class itself? The political crisis 
of which we talked so much, has been brought on directly by 
the working class struggle. The struggle from the early 
seventies onward reflects a growing desire for ciassunitv 
and solidarity. This is best exemplified by the phenomenal 
growth of the trade union movement (it has grown by 53% over 
the last three years) and the growing incidence of strikes. 
The noteworthy feature of these strikes has been the growing 
number that relate to victimization and unfair dismissal. 
This reflects a growing class conciousness on the part of 
the workers.
While the working class has made enormous gains via indepen­
dent trade union movement, the latter has been marked by a 
clear shift to the right of the leadership. The erstwhile 
"progressive" unions talk now of "weathering the storm" of 
recession, instead of understanding now more than ever there 
is a need to link the daily focus of trade union struggle 
to the major political issues of the day. When this is done, 
it occurs in the form of sheer tokenism; the occasional mass 
meeting, a letter to the honourable Minister asking for the 
exemption of basic foodstuff from G.S.T., and so on. From 
the recent events in the TransvaH it is quite clear that 
the working class is not prepared to "mark time" with the 
trade union leadership. Instead workers will increasingly 
pressurise their leadership to develop the forms of organi­
sation and ffietneds ef snuggle enae ean best defend enem
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against increasing isaier isat ion.
Objective conditions propel .tore ana more layers cf tne 
working class into struggle. Lamontviiie, Cradeok, the Vaal 
triangle and Soweto are all aflame with worker militancy. 
Nor is this situation confined to urban areas. The severe 
drought of the last two years has created great hardship for 
tne rural workers. Unemployment and starvation are rife. 
(Farmers collectively are in debt to the tune of R2 000 
biiliion). In the Eastern Transvaal, dissident unemployed 
farm workers have taken to roaming from farm to farm, crea­
ting a general climate of tension and instability.
White workers have not escaped unscathed, either. The despe­
rate money shortage which the state faces means that some of 
its cherisned privileges such as housing subsidies and free 
education must now be kiss ad goodbye. Nor can the 
bourgeoisie any longer afford the luxury of job reservation. 
Soon these wiil be scrapped altogether. The white section of 
the working class too has one of two choicesjeither it 
shifts to the Conservative Party and becomes the first 
battalion of fascism, cr it joins in the struggle of black 
workers, as at Highveid Steel, where black workers belonging 
to MAWU and white, skilled workers oeionging to the S.A. 
Boilermakers Society, undertook a joint strike ballot. 73s 
of the workers voted in favour of a joint string.
If working class struggle over the last decade has always 
been heroic, then it has also been characterised by its 
essentially spontaneous and unco-ordinated nature. This is 
not surprising. Objective conditions drive workers into 
struggle, but the working class lacks the leadership and the 
organisational forms to give proper expression to its 
straggle. Without proper channeling and co-ordination of 
working class rent struggles, transport struggles and 
factory struggles, it will be impossible for working class 
struggle in general to be raised to higher levels.
THE WAY FORWARS
What then is the way forward for the working class in the 
era of "The New Deal"? Our emphasis must be threefold. 
Firstly, we must continue our commitment to building strong, 
independent working class organisations, untainted by bour­
geois influences. Ever-mindfui of the contradiction between 
the objective conditions which increasingly oblige more ar.i 
more workers to engage in class struggle, and the primitive 
methods at its disposal, we must oe sufficiently farsighted 
and bold to initiate timeousiv newer and better 
organisational forms tnac correspond with tne dictates of 
class struggle intensifying in rhythm. Concretely this means 
popularising workers clubs, initiating committees on prices, 
unemployment, housing action committees and having these 
generalised. This will afford us the prospect of co-ordina­
ting- working- class' strut-gi'r/ o~f- wre's-rimrsp swt'itfrrs- tfe=
working class away from its reactionary petit-bourgeois 
leadership, and raising to higher levels working class 
struggle. This process must be seeen as a first step in the 
process of building the Workers United Front, which is the 
best weapon for the working class in defending its constan­
tly eroding living standards. The Workers United front 
provides the working class with the necessary unity in 
struggle to allow it to go immediately on the offensive in 
this defence of its living standards. It can in this way 
best confront an already frightened and uncertain 
bourgeoisie and drive its advantage home to the hilt.
Secondly, the demand of the Workers United front must be for 
a Constituent Assembly, convened by the democratically 
elected representatives of the masses themselves. The demand 
for a Constituent Assembly is predicated on the 
understanding that the interests of the bourgeoisie and the 
working class are absolutely irreconci1ible. There can be no 
question of a "deal" or a compromise. Any such deal or 
compromise, no matter what "conditions" are attached, can 
only extend the life of capitalism and the untold misery of 
the toiling masses.
Thirdly, and lastly, the pressure which the working class 
has increasingly brought to bear on political life in S.A., 
has forced all tendencies to recognise the independence of 
its interests. This situation has led to much fashionable 
talk of "working class struggle" and the “leadership role of 
the working class" in the struggle. Weaved into all this 
rhetoric are some more blatantly reformist slogans , which, 
if they take root within the political conciousness of the 
working class, can only lead to its betrayal and defeat. For 
us, then, the task must be a turn to theory, to study it 
constantly, for without it we will not be able to rid the 
working class of petty bourgeois, and utimately, bourgeois 
influences that seek to deflect the working class from 
fulfilling its historic task.
-11-
The Vaai Uprising AND THE NEED FOR A WORKERS UNITED FRONT
THE CLASS STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES
Over the past few moncns the working class has come out in 
open struggle against its growing impoverishment and misery. 
The convergence of disparate and largely spontaneous strike 
actions and militant rent protests into the massive 2-day 
stayaway of half a million workers in the Transvaal serves 
as a signal warning of decisive battles to come. What is at 
stake is not this or that partial g a m  out the choice of two 
stark alternatives - either tragic defeat, demoralisation 
ana the likelihood of fascist rule, or a decisive struggle 
for a new progressive social order.
The events in the Transvaal and tne Eastern Cape spell out 
far better than any pamphlet or article tne tasks of all 
committed working class fighters - the overwhelming and 
spontaneous yearning felt by workers for united defence 
against the attacks of bosses and the state and the need for 
a weii-developed and consistent tactical approach to the 
question of united working class defence. Instinctively the 
working class nas underscooa the depth and tne extent of tne 
economic crises and through its as yet disparate and uneven 
struggles n$s pointed out the need for united action to its 
present heel-dragging leadersnip.
Two weeks ago the Minister of Finance announced with aitter 
irony that we have in fact just lived througn a mini-boom 
and that tne nation snouid prepare for even darker times in 
1335. This "mini-Doom" has already made devastating inroads 
into the impoverished living standards of tne exploited. The 
fall of the rand from 130 US cents in 1981 to 50 cents in 
1984, the downturn in the gold price, an inflation rate of 
13% and .tne high interest rates have forced productivity 
down and dealt a severe oiow to the profits of tne bosses. 
Forced into a catcn-22 situation which demands that South 
Africa increase its productivity and its exports in order to 
remain competitive on the world market and correct its 
massive balance of payments deficit, the bosses have sought 
only one path - to shift the task of lifting a crippled 
economy out of its stagnation onto the working class.
Reai wage cuts, higher prices, mass scale retrenchments, 
short-time and a more intensive exploitation of a smaller 
number of workers are forcing the vast majority of tne 
country into a day-to-day struggle for survival. The bosses 
have cut all corners in their rapacious drive. Since July 
3200 workers have been retrencned in the motor industry and 
factories nave been closed down well before Christmas so 
that bosses can avoid paying holiday bonuses.
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Ac the same time the state, facing a debt of three and a 
half million rand and with its expanding tri-cameral 
bureaucracy to sustain, has cutback on expenses which 
vitally affect the working class. A sixty-eight million rand 
cut in public transport subsidy, removal of subsidies on 
basic foodstuffs, a drastic cut in the amount of funds 
available for housing to a mere eighty million rand and its 
inability to pay out the meagre pensions that it offers to 
the exploited. In the face of this the working class is 
forced to finance a defence bill of S3 755 million and prop 
up the homelands with R1 650 million by spending 12% of its 
wages on GST. While the "nation” is called on to "tighten 
its belt" the working class is being strangled.
The militant rumblings of the working class are a direct 
response to these severe attacks. Workers are increasingly 
prepared to lay their jobs, their homes and even their lives 
on the line to express their indignation. Strikes for higher 
wages on the gold mines, for union recognition, against the 
victimisation of fellow workers; protests against transport 
increases and rent hikes; opposition to "African" town 
council and ethnic parliamentary elections - this is the 
workers' answer to Botha's so-called "New Deal".
THE VAAL STRUGGLES
It was out of such disparate and spontaneous struggles that 
events in tne Transvaal and Eastern Cape reached a head. In 
the midst of massive student uprisings against an oppressive 
education system, township after township in the Vaal 
triangle and on the East Rand erupted into an open and 
militant rejection of the rant increases introduced by the 
new financially bankrupt Town Councils. In mid July workers 
in Tumanoie near Par ys protested against the GST increase 
and a 15% rise in rents. Close on their heels followed the 
tenants in Daveyton and Tembisa on the East Rand where 
thousands of workers retrenched in the metal and chemical 
industries faced an increased rental charge. Militant action 
spread to Saulsville, A t t e r i d g e v i l l e  and Rathanda to 
escalate into a demonstration in Evaton, Sharpeville and 
Sebokeng which left 31 dead. Central to ail these struggles 
have been demands that the rent increases be dropped, that 
rents be reduced and that town councillors resign. Central 
to the escalating militancy of the protests has been the 
violent action cf the state - shootings, arrests and massive 
intimidation through the army-police raids on Sebokeng, 
Sharpeville and Boipatong.
Pusning through the surface of these separate struggles was 
the common reality of a iife-ana-death defensive action on 
the part of all workers and an urgency for united action.
The various UDF civic associations in the Transvaal, COSAS, 
FOSATU and CUSA were forced to recognise the groundsweii and
f n r m r 'T1 ** at t* a -= ’ o ^  r* ’ a « g ^ o -> •. r ~ -* «
coordinate a regional 2-day stayaway in response to the
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repressive actions of the state. The success of the stayaway 
- 85% on the East Sand and 90% in the Vaai Triangle was a 
clear testimony to the militant mood of the workers. 
Predictaoly the state and the dosses responded with-brute 
force - 6 908 worsers being retrenched at SASGL 2 and 3 and 
immediate detention of the stayaway organisers.
But beneath the events lie the seeds of defeat and 
d e m o r a l i s a t i o n .  For fcne t r a d i t i o n a l  p o p u l i s t  and 
"progressive" trade union leadership the lessons made so 
clear oy the actions of workers are being entirely missed. 
Instead of grasping the need to prepare new organisational 
forms and methods of struggle for coordinated defence of the 
working class the UDF is riding a nostalgic high by looking 
back to tne stayaways of the fifties and measuring its 
success in terms of how much publicity it has received. On 
the other hand the unions, somewhat shaken by their reckless 
abandonment of cowardly survival politics in the recession, 
have been negotiating away the possibility of further action 
with the bosses. Through their retrenchment deals with the 
bosses, their strategy of weathering the recession in order 
to survive and their formalistic, sectarian and bureaucratic 
approach to worker unity tney show not an inkling of a real 
understanding of the full meaning of tne economic crisis for 
the working class and offer a suicidal course of "marking 
time".
Tne question of 'defence' is not to be understood in dry- 
formal terms of protecting what presently exists. A formal 
compromise with bosses on short-time or retrenchment may 
protect a union and its membership in the snort term out 
loses all meaning for the real defence of the working class 
when the ground is being swept from under their feet in a 
hundred otner ways through rant increases, high prices, 
forced removals etc. To tne question of d e f e.n c e the 
spontaneous answer of the workers in the Transvaal is 
written in blood on the streets of the townships - no to 
hign rents, no to wages chat snrins with higher prices and 
sales tax, no to retrencnmenc, no to forced removals, police 
detentions and mass arrests - yes to the defence of the 
interests of tne whole working class tnrougn united action.
AFTER THE STAYAWAY - THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP
The burning lessons of the Transvaal workers' struggles have 
to a large extent gone unheeded. As the smoke begins to 
clear it becomes evident that the populists and the trade 
union leadership continue to travel along their respective 
paths of publicity politics and c a u t i o u s a c o n o m i s m .
;df
Having raised its profile dramatically in the north, the UDF 
hastened to organise a bus boycott in the Western Cape. 
Not having agitated extensively on the fare increases nor 
having assessed carefully the willingness or unwillingness
of w o r kers to undertake such action, a m o u n t e d  to 
adventurism. Lack of real support for the campaign forced 
the organisers to retreat into a token two-day protest 
The opportunistic nature of the boycott did not lie in the 
fact that there was a poor response, but rather in the 
complete absence of any attempt to advance the struggle of 
workers organisationally or to raise and politicise their 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of their declining living standards. 
Instead of simply trotting out the t i m e - w o r n  slogan 
"Transport for people and r.ot for profits" it was absolutely 
essential to make the connection between this single attack 
on the living standards of workers and the economic crisis 
as a whole. Only in this way can the struggle around busfare 
increases be consciously deepened and extended to embrace 
the struggle against rent increases, rising prices, low 
wages and unempoyment.
Organisationally what is required is not simply a grouping 
of seasoned organisers but the timely establishment of 
action committees of workers that would for example monitor 
far*, increases, agitate extensively .round the transport 
crisis arid its relation to other attacks on workers, be 
instrumental in the establishment of committees in new 
areas, and in the process build up the confidence and power 
of workers to exert control over various aspects of their 
lives.
The CDF's publicity campaign has also proceeded apece beyond 
the borders of South Africa. Scarcely had interest in the 
"•urban consulate affair begun to wane than American liberals 
'ere queuing up outside South African embassies to stage 
sit-in protests against the detention of trade unionists and 
political activists, while Boesak's invitation to -Ted 
Penned/ to visit South Africa only mada small news, the 
grander attempt by UDF-syrapathirer Tutu to persaode Reagan 
to disinvest reached tne headlines. No doubt the South 
African state keeps a wary eye on the effects of these 
actions on its cherished relation of " c onstructive 
engagement" with the USA, but it is also grateful that the 
CJDF doss not pay more attention to mobilising the exploited 
within soutn Africa,
The Trees Unions
In cont r a s t  to the UDF, Fosatu was "most unhappy" 
about having been forced to ride the crest of the recant 
worker uprising. The detention of key union organisers and 
the retrenchment of 6883 SA30L workers shocked tho FOSATU 
leadership into the realisation that "Me are now dealing 
with the state. We have a tiger ny the tail." Shortly after 
the stsyaway FOSATU convened union meetings to decide what 
action should be taken against the sacking of the SASOL 
workers. The recommendations tnat were made, notable only 
for their lack of boldness, hardly bore any relation to the 
militancy of the Transvaal workers:
* that unions past pressure on bosses to take sices on
-IS-
the SASOL issue.
* that pressure be brought to bear on the Federal 
Chamber of Industries and foreign companies to 
persaude SASOL to reemploy the dismissed workers.
* a "Black Christmas" in wnicn workers would boycott
tne festive season (even tnougn the economic crisis 
forces the working class more than ever before into 
a "3iack Christmas'* anyway).
* and most recently a higniy elaborate legalistic
scheme that would eventually culminate in a national 
one-hour legal w o r k - s t o p p a g e  as a means of 
pressurising SASOL into reinstating the 6830 
There is very little cnance that any of these formal, 
legalistic and protracted -gestures of solidarity can be 
filled out with any militant content, unless the unions set 
up permanent committees of snop stewards that can constantly 
monitor, coordinate and combine parochial struggles at 
individual trade unions into defensive united action then 
any isolated expression of solidarity will be futile in this 
period of intensified class struggle. It can only be hoped 
that this urgent form of unity is not being dismissed 
bureaucratically as a threat to the "sensitive" trade union 
unity talks that are still in progress.
The caution of tne unions in this period is not accidental 
but an expression of two fundamentally incorrect strategies. 
Firstly, the unions have understood their tasks in this 
period of economic recession in a very parochial sense. The 
attack of the bosses threatens the survival of the unions 
wnicn should therefore keep a very low profile and weather 
tne crisis. This line of reasoning sees defence of existing 
organisations as being more of a priority than defence of 
tne working class. For the working class to keep a low 
profile would mean to suDir.it to greater impoverishment and 
more intensive exploitation. Secondly, some unions 
(particularily FC-SATU) see the task of organising workers as 
somenow separate from the process of struggle itself. 
Unions, they claim, should delay their involvement in 
political struggle until sucn time as strong national trade 
unions nave oeen ouilt, built, that is, around exclusively 
factory floor issues. In a period which requires tnat 
workers draw togetner all aspects of their exploitation and 
oppression ana which makes every so-called 'economic' 
struggle immediately political as well, such a strategy can 
only drag the organised working class oackwards.
What Alternative is there?
The tass of taxing tne call for united action forward 
organisationally poses a direct challenge to traditional and 
roucine leadersnip. Protest policies aimed at "snaking the 
state to its senses" and raising the profile of populist 
leadersnip togetner with the unions' reluctant aconomistic 
participation in struggle does not take workers forward one 
inen in the present period. Worse still it acts as a brake 
on the initiative taken by workers and tnereoy tnreatens to
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undermine the growing confidence of a working class on the 
move. The alternative is not adventurism. Premature mass 
action can only speii defeat at the hands of state 
repression and thus the likelihood of a serious setnack that 
could render tne woricmg class defenceless and demoralised 
for a long period. An irony of mstory is that adventuristic 
initiatives are in most cases the flipside of a vacillating 
directionless reliance on spontaneous pressures from below. 
Both display an opportunism that takes as its starting point 
tne narrow sectional interests of particular organisations 
and which ignores tne objective needs of the working class, 
its actual movement in struggle and tne need to consciously 
fasnion new forms of organisation and methods of struggle.
The question of timing is obviously important but must be 
given its proper weight within a broader understanding of 
the way forward and the tasks of the day. What is most 
crucial is that within our understanding of the need for 
united defensive worker action through a Workers United 
Front we begin to make timely preparations for tne decisive 
struggles to c o m e . This does not mean building up trade 
unions at the factory floor until we deem them large enough 
to regard attacks on the living standards of workers 
as "political". Nor does it mean courting tneliberai 
Imperialist bourgeoisie in anticipation of a National 
Convention. It means underst a n d i n g  the reality of an 
irreversible economic crisis tnat is forcing the working 
Ciass into a oactle for survival. It means that the fate of 
the working ciass will depend on its anility to defend 
itself. It means a far-reaching innovation of our tradition­
al organisational forms into structures that are able to 
break down the boundaries between "civic" and "factory" 
issues and draw in workers on the widest possible level be 
they organised or unorganised, employed or unemployed. It 
means tne coordination of action committees, unions, factory 
committees and otner worker organisations on a local, 
regional and national level. It means building a Workers 
United Front.
UNITED ACTION AND THE WORKERS UNITED FRONT
One of tne most significant developments in the progressive 
trade union movement of late is tne proposed new trade union 
federation. It marks an important step m  the organisation 
of the working class in South Africa. Its present non­
affiliation to any political organisation is progressive 
insofar as it has broken with tne 3ACTU tradition of 
s u r r e ndering independent working class interests to 
populism, but reactionary insofar as it is motivated for 
eonomistic reasons.
The proposed federation is however, frought with sectarian, 
divisive and Bureaucratic features that stand in the way of 
united working class action. Workers should seek unity on 
the basis of their common experiences of retrenchment, 
u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  bad housing and low wages rather than
- 1 7 -
according to the political affiliation of their union or on 
issues sucn as union registration and participation on 
Industrial Councils. In its proposals to the April 1983 
trade union unity talks, the Orange Vaal General Workers 
Onion rejected the "bureaucratic solution" that many of the 
major industrial unions are imposing on the task of ouiiaing 
trade union unity. They argue correctly that worker unity 
cannot be formally constructed through "manoeuvres at a 
leadership level" which aim to federate like-minded unions, 
but that it must be built by workers in struggle and find 
its organisational form in worker-led Solidarity Action 
Committees. These SAC’S must not only draw in workers across 
union lines and provide the basis for uniting organised 
workers, as was proposed, but must call into their“ranks the 
unorganised and unemployed as well.
The task of establishing worker unity in an organised form 
has been approached in a very formalistic manner by FOSATU. 
They dismiss ‘united front unity1 on the basis of its loose­
ness and rack of discipline and because of procedural 
problems of decision-making and representation. The better 
option, they argue, is a ‘tight federation* or 'disciplined 
unity' where affiates suoscribe to a common political 
p o s i t i o n  a n d  a r e  b o u n d  t o g e t h e r  v e r y  c l o s e l y  
organisationally. To counterpose the two is extremely 
problematic. A ‘tight federation' of likeminded organis­
ations is necessary and desirable but it is by definition 
exclusive and therefore unaole to respond to the need to 
unite all workers. Furthermore, when united defensive action 
is on m e  order of the day how could sucn a 'tight 
federation' become a part of a regular coordinated force 
witn otner worker organisations other than through the 
United Front strategy?
In 1980 the Metal and Allied Workers Union (a FOSATU 
affiliate) set up Shop Steward Councils in the Geraiston 
area to help alleviate the work load of the union organisers 
ana to streamline recruitment to the union. These councils 
developed spontaneously into dynamic workers committees that 
drew cogetner shop stewards in the area from a number of 
different unions. As more and more militant workers swelled 
the ranks of the SSC it began to operate with ever- 
increasing independence from the formal union structure. The 
year 1981 confronted workers in the East Rand area with 
drastic price increases, a 30% rent hike, retrenchments and 
a tighter than ever enforcement of influx control. This led 
to a strike wave of unprecedented proportions in which the 
SSC played a vital role oy generalising the experiences at 
different factories and coordinating both the recruitment 
and struggles of worxers. The council not only gave 
conscious expression to the need for united action in 
factory floor issues but also attempted to give direction in 
tne struggle for better housing in Katiehong.
FOSATU was disturbed by the 'looseness' of these councils
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w m c h  oegan to flounder due to the U c k of overall direction 
that they were given and to the inexperience of the shop 
stewards.In April 1932 Fosa tu dealt a death blow to these 
potential action const!ittees oy drawing them formally into 
the-union structure. Wnatever good intentions FOSATU had in 
streamlining its organisational structure in this manner, it 
amounted oojectively to nothing less than the bureaucratic 
stifling of an extremely progressive development in the 
labour movement. The lesson of the Germiston SSC is an
The lesson of the Germiston SSC isan extremely important 
one. It gives us a concrete e x a m p l e  of the kind of 
organisation that can best take forward the defensive 
struggle of workers in this period. The collapse of the 
G e r m i s t o n  SSC was less due to its lack of "sound 
organisational foundations" as Swilling argues in the SALS 
out to serious leadership prcolems. The strength of the SSC 
lay in its militant worker content, its weakness, in the 
fact that it was not a part of a broader plan. Such a plan 
would not nave incorporated the SSC into the formal 
structure of a union but would nave sougnt to generalise tne 
new form of organisation and to propogate its necessity as 
the building clock of a Workers United Front.
AN URGENT TASS
Conditions of economic crisis and the severe attack on the 
living standards cf workers make their united defence tne 
most urgent task of tne day. This truth is being borne out 
daily in the militant spontaneous struggles that are 
escalating ana oy tne readiness with whicn workers have 
siezed nold of structures such as the SSC's. The leadership 
of tne exploited and oppressed need to go beyond isolated 
and improvised defensive actions to propogate the formation 
of committees of action in ail areas of working class 
struggle. It is crucial that sucn committees transcend the 
divisions and political differences that exist in the 
working class and tnat tney draw in ail workers, even the 
most oackward and unorganised layers. Unless tne most 
impoverished and desperate are drawn into the struggle in 
tnis way tney will fail prey to hrioes and be mobilised into 
fascist gangs.
Where existing leader snip acts as a otase on worker 
militancy, workers must tnrust forward tneir own leaders. 
Workers must form factory c o m m i t t e e s  alongside tne 
traditional trade unions if the latter try to divert the 
militancy of workers into partial economistic struggles or 
where they negotiate away worker's jobs in retrenchment 
deals. The present economic crisis does not allow the 
ieadersnip of tne working class to denounce open action in 
the name of 'defence', nor to e m o a r k  on isolated 
adventuristic action. The task is to create the political 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  conditions that can generalise, 
coordinate and sustain defensive action and to make clear 
tne general prospects of such a struggle. The call must be
for committees of action on a local and regional level and 
their coordination on a national level through a Workers 
United Front*
The workers United Front cannot be calledinto being 
overnight through a formal agreement at a leadership level. 
The successful development of a Workers United Front depends 
on wnetner or not it is a movement that is built ‘from 
below' in the heat of working class struggle. The task of 
the leadership is to propogate a clear idea of the way 
forward and to agitate in every struggle for tne formation 
of defensive worker conun 1 ttees.
It is important finally to consider the general principles 
on which a united front of workers organisations would 
operate.Firstly it is open to ail workers; employed, 
unemployed, organised, unorganised and cannot exclude any 
section of the working class as a matter of principle. 
Insofar as 'white workers' in South Africa are exploited as 
workers they cannot be excluded; insofar as they have 
historically sided with the forces of reaction it is the 
task of activists to attract them to the Workers United 
Front over the neads of their leadership. Secondly the WOF 
is only open to workers and workers' organisations. This 
does not mean that the oppressed middle class is to be 
excluded from the struggle but that it recognise the need 
for workers tc unite to defend themselves as a class and to 
organise themselves independently as the leading force in 
tne struggle against exploitation and oppression. Neither 
does it mean that existing alliances that include non-worker 
organisations such as youtn affiliates must simply disband. 
Insofar as they recognise the need for the independent 
organisation of the working class ana the need for united 
working class defence tney are the immediate vehicles for 
propagating and building tne Workers United Front.Lastly, 
eacn organisation chat enters tne united front has the right 
to maintain its independence ana to criticise tne leadership 
of otner organisations. Although eacn member-organisation of 
the front is pound by the discipline of ‘unity in action' it 
retains the riant to put forward an independent position.
One of the strongest criticisms of the call for a Workers 
United Front in South Africa is t n a t it "ignores the 
peculiarity of the South African struggle" (ie. the fact of 
oppression and cne assumed identity cf interests between the 
oppressed middle class and the working class). Recognition 
of cne need for a WUF is based on the understanding that the 
working class must be organised independently of ai1 ctner 
classes and lest we lose our bearings in our apparent 
uniqueness we must realise that just as the economic crisis 
and the growth of fascism are international trends so the 
Workers United Front is not a 'European' solution to a 
'European* proolem. Just as tne coalminers' strike is the 
clarion call for united working class defence in Britain so 
the recent struggles in the Transvaal reveal to us the 
urgent need for a Workers United Front in Uoutn Africa.
>>fS
Coalminers Strike
(Which way
THS COALMINERS' STRIKE - AK URGENT CALL FROM 
WORKING CLASS
Ten years ago, in Che 'winter of discontent', a nationwide 
coalminers' strike brought Britain's Conservative government 
to its knees. In Match of this year the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUMj once again called on its members to down 
tools, this time in response to the decision of the National 
Coal Board to shut down "uneconomic" pits. The strike, which 
nas now entered its ninth month, has been one of tne most 
militant and protracted struggles of a section of tne 
British working class this century. In the wake of pitch 
battles between picketing miners and police the strike has 
cost the British Treasury upward of R4 billion thus far and 
has made a 3,5% dent in industrial production. The use of 
oil instead of coal to fuel the power stations, whose cool 
reserves have dropped from 17 million tons to 4,5 million 
since early July, has quadrupled the expenses of electricity 
production.
At this point however there are strong signs that the 
determination of the miners is beginning to flag and that 
the strike may collapse. While HUM stili confidently defies 
a flurry of court rulings, its assets of Ri8,9 Bullion have 
been out in the charge of a government receiver and are net 
accessible to striking miners. Although Scargiil continues 
to adamantly reject peace offers from the Coal Board there 
is strong pressure from, the Trade Union Congress leaders to 
call off the strike. Most crucially, about one-third of the 
original 189 30v5 strikers have returned to work; demoralised 
with the lack of success and lured underground by offers 
from the Coal Board of R3 396, Christmas bonuses.
The threat of retrenchment facing che coalminers is not the 
only issue at stake in this conflict. Like the recent 
militant struggles in South Africa, it has brought the 
central question of our times sharply to the fore; is 
degenerating capitalism to rumble down the path to fascism 
and crush all forms of democracy in its wake, or will the 
working class be aole to defend itself against this 
onslaught and translate its defence into a progressive 
reordering of society?
Neither course is predetermined, but the option is posed 
more starkly every time the working class comes out in open 
struggle against increasing attacks on its living standards. 
Although Thatcher has not yet succeeded in breaking the 
strike decisively, the symptoms of collapse and the 
parochial, hesitant and opportunistic behaviour of the 
reformist TtlC and Labour Party portend years of 
demoralisation for a large section, if not the whole, of tne 
British working class.
Britain)
T H £ BRITISH
21
To say that the outcome of open civil war is not 
predetermined is not to suggest that its course is 
unaffected by man's intervention. The course of class 
struggle is very much shaped by the relation of concrete 
forces - by the relative strengths of the classes in 
conflict. In this process the direction given by the 
leadership of the working class, its ability to develop the 
forms of organisation and methods of struggle that 
correspond to the needs of worker defence is of fundamental 
importance.
It is essential that the British working class, and the 
working class internationally, understand the coalminers’ 
strike as a clear expression of the intensified class 
conflict that is being forced into the open by the deepening 
economic crisis. It is significant not simply as another 
milestone in a long history of labour struggles but as the 
clarion call from the British working class for workers to 
enter decisive struggle through united action. For the 
traditional TOC and Labour Party leadership to hold back the 
militant tide with, tneir routine econonustic and parochial 
responses is to leave the working class defenceless 1 r. the 
face of the extraordinary methods of attack being used by 
the ruling class.
TWO IMPORTANT LESSONS
There are two important lessons that need to be drawn out of 
the recent events in Britain.
Firstly, the brutal actions of the Thatcher government in 
the form of anti-union legislation and unprecedented 
military-style police action reveal quite clearly that the 
ruling class in Britain can no longer allow workers to 
exercise their hard-won democratic rights. In a period of 
deepening economic crisis Britain has spawned the 
conservative bulwark of Thatcherism to enable the state to 
make deep inroads into social security welfare and to force 
British workers to sumbit to state cutbacks, retrenchments, 
unemployment and declining living standards. In a desperate 
attempt to protect declining profits the British state, the 
one-time bastion of bourgeois democracy, is increasingly 
giving way to the last refuge of degenerate capitalism, 
namely fascist rule.
Secondly, the leadership of the British working class, 
deeply rooted in a reformist and economistic tradition, has 
shown itself incapable of breaking with its past to give 
militant miners the appropriate means to undertake effective 
united action in their defence. In spite of his radical 
rhetoric Scargili has not gone beyond calling for 
"protectionism" as a concrete alternative to pit closures. 
Even the loud calls for support made by tiUM to other 
sections of the British working class have been based 
narrowly on support for the miners' cause specifically and
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not as a means of extending their militant action. The 
response of other trade unions has oesn hesitant and erratic 
and is echoed formally by TOC's reluctant expression of 
solidarity. Whatever dent the miners' strike may make cn 
Thatcher's recession policies no single section of the 
British working class will be able to defend itself properly 
unless its struggle becomes generalised organisationally 
through a Workers' United Front and practically by means of 
a general strike.
THATCHERISM AND THE ATTACK Oil THE COALMINERS -THE DRIFT 
TOWARDS FASCISM
Britain's Economic Crisis
Britain, the pace-setter of progressive capitalist 
development in the 19 t n century, has not escaped the 
international economic crisis. The second Imperialist War 
of 1939-1945 signalled Britain's eclipse by the USA as the 
most advanced capitalist country in the world. Introducing 
itself as the "arsenal of the democracies" during the war, 
America took cn the task of pumping millions of dollars in 
aid, leans and capital investment into the war-torn 
economies of Britain and Western Europe.
With this massive injection of capital, Britain was able to 
resurrect its young pre-war welfare policies and once again 
passify the working class through massive state expenditure 
and social security. The foundations of this post-war boom 
were however extremely shaky, based as they were on the 
reckless policy of deficit budgeting. The resultant 
inflation, balance of payments deficit and massive debt 
problem forced Britain into a period of economic stagnation, 
in the late 1960’s - a recession which reached crisis
proportions 26 years later .
Thatcher's Monetarism - A Severe Attack On The British 
Work Inc Class
The year 1980 saw the beginning of the worst recession in 
Britain in more than 43 years with inflation running at 23%, 
a 22% interest rate, 3 million unemployed and a 2,3% decline 
in GDP. It also saw the Conservative Party oust the Labour 
government at the election pells and the ruling class dig in 
its heels behind a decisive anti-recession policy - 
Thatcher's monetarism. In essence Thatcher's solution to 
rampant inflation and the effects of budget deficiting is to 
cut back drastically on public spending. Directed more 
against capital investment and state expenditure than 
against consumer spending, the monetarist anti-inflation 
policy takes the form of "privatisation" of state industry 
{this is even making inroads into the National 
Health Service), the withdrawal of state subsidies for 
ailing industries, drastic cutbacks on local government
spending and a severe clipping of social security benefits.
While these austerity measures to some extent force 
capitalists to "tighten their belts" they in fact mean a 
severe attack on the living standards of British workers - 
high unemployment, retrenchments, cutbacks on housing, 
education and health and a drop in real wages. Bracing 
herself for strong resistance from the organised working 
class, the "Iron Lady" has abandoned the laissez-faire 
consensus politics of Labour governments, centred decision- 
making firmly at IS Downing Street and declared total war cn 
the political weight of the trade unions.
In March. 1984 the Coal Board announced that it would be 
closing 28 "uneconomic" pits which meant that 20 000 men 
would lose their jobs. The unemployment figure in Britain 
stands at 3,3 million and is rising at the rate of 19 0U0 a 
day. On 10 March 1984, 188 308 coal miners came out or.
strike against the pit closures. The announcement to close 
the pits was not an accidental one according to the whims of 
some politician, but a weii-strategised long-term plan.
In May 1978, THE ECONOMIST printed a draft of the Ridley 
Report written by a Tory Mp. it proposed privatisation of 
nationalized industries in an attempt to shift the state's 
economic burdens to the private sector in a period of 
economic decline. Ridley expected resistance from unions 
over wage reductions and redundancies as some of the 
consequences of the proposals. The Coal Industry was cited 
as a likely area of resistance, thus Ridley proposed that 
the government should make preparations to cope with 
possible worker opposition. The proposals were that the 
government should:-
1. Build up coal stock, particularly at power stations.
2. Make contingency plans for the import of coal.
3. Encourage hauliers to recruit non-union drivers.
4. Introduce dual coal/oil firing in ail power stations.
5. Cut off money supply to strikers and make the unions
finance them.
6. Establish a large mobile squad of police to deal with
picketing.
The Ridley Report had a two-fold thrust - to suggest 
austerity measures by which the state could cut back on its 
expenditure on failing industries, and to propose methods 
which the state could use to resist protracted strike 
action; methods which Thatcher has wasted no time in 
implementing.
The Drift To Fascism
To strengthen the barricades against working class 
resistance the Thatcher government introduced a barrage of 
anti-union legislation when it came to power in 1938.
2 4 -
* In May 1988 Social Security {No. 2) Bill was passed, it
penalises strikers' families by deducting assumed strike 
pay from social security payments. -This deduction would 
be made irrespective of whether workers were actually 
receiving strike pay or not.
* In August the employment Act introduced restrictions on
picketing and "secondary" action e.g. sympathy strikes.
* The Employment Act of 1982 makes unions finacialiy
liable in court for 1 illegal" action; it further 
redefines "Trade disputes" making it difficult to 
determine what kind of industrial action is permissible 
within the law.
* A further Bill was passed calling for compulsory secret
oallot for strikers and for the election of union 
officials. The government justified these laws by 
claiming that they were an attempt to “democratize" 
unions. But these antiunion laws are an attempt to 
disarm unions politically and reduce them to the role of 
"benefit societies".
Thatcher's introduction of these repressive restrictions on 
trade union rights has not prevented workers from defending 
themselves. There have been numerous major strikes during 
the Conservative Party's reign. The steelworkers in (1583), 
civil servants {1981), health workers (1982), train and 
print workers (1983), and now the coalminers (1984). These 
workers recognise that attacks on their living standards and 
political rights is reducing them to a state of 
immiseration, and that their struggle is therefore one for 
survival.
In many cases this has brought unions into a he a don- 
collision with Thatcher's antiunion legislation. The train 
drivers and print workers came into conflict with the courts 
earlier this year for defying the laws against secondary 
picketing. Despite the law against secondary picketing a 
serious attack on the democratic right of British workers to 
mobilise support for their action this tactic has been 
widely used by the striking coalminers. The British courts 
alledge that the strike is illegal because NUM called the 
strike without conducting a national ballot of all its 
members.
One of the most marked features of the strike has been the 
unprecedented use of naked force by the state. Behind the 
media attacks on Scargill, the court injunctions against the 
NUM and Thatcher's tirades against the "mob", the British 
police have become a direct arm of attack in the state's 
attempt to break the strike. 85 800 arrests, hundreds
injured, 2 deaths, phonetapping, surveillance of miners, 
harrassment of pickets and overt intimidation of miners'
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families and others lending material support to the strikers 
bear testimony to the desperation of the government. In a 
striking parallel with the SADF invasions of working class 
township in the Transvaal, British riot police terrorised 
the militant miner stronghold of Armthorpe, smashing their 
way into workers* houses in an attempt to intimidate 
pickets.
But the state's response to the action of the coalminers has 
not been a simple one of unsophisticated brute force and 
repression, it has to a large extent not yet played its full 
hand and has b ^ n  cautious in its implementation of the new 
ar.tiunior* legislation. Fearing the uni too strength 0 Ltie 
working class, the British, government has deliberately not 
taken action -gainst other unions which have undertaken 
hesitant supportive action as that would be a sure way of 
driving them closer to the militant miners and of 
precipitating a general strike. For example n court 
injunction was served on railwavj-.en for the "illegal" 
secondary action they took by refusing to carry coal to 
steel plants. No doubt British Rail was keen net to 
antagonise its workers, keeping in mind the devastating 
affects th?t the 1980 national strike had on the British 
steel industry.
Instead the sw.-.te has played off different sections of the 
British working class against one another in a number of 
ways. Firstly it has exploited long nurtured divisions 
amongst the coalminers. In the 1970's the National Coal 
Board introduced areabared productivity schemes which 
resulted in different levels of earnings from area to area. 
The cion c as of 1934 have coincided with this scheme, that 
is, less productive pits have been closed and the more 
"profitable1 or tc are still open. It is not surprising that 
resistance to the trike from amongst coalminers has come 
largely from Nottinghamshire 'here wages are relatively 
high.
Furthermore the barrage of criticism that has been levelled 
against Scargill by the state and the press for net holding 
a compulsory secret ballot before taking strike action has 
found credibility amongst reactionary mineworkers. The 
rightwing section cf HUM has repeatedly criticised the 
initiators of the strike for being ’’undemocratic". To these 
accusations Scargill responded by referring to the decision 
to close the pits, "Nobody balloted the 20033 who will lose 
their jobs." Secondly the state has been able to rely quite 
confidently on the bankruptcy of the traditional leadership 
of the British working class to weaken the resistance of the 
coalminers. Thatcher has obviously fostered the careerist 
power struggles in the TUC and the Labour Party as well as 
the parochial interests of many of the individual unions in 
order to paralyse the one form of action that would bring 
her government crashing to the ground united defensive 
action in the form of a general strike.
O 
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THE LEADERSHIP CRTS I N B R I T A I N
The Militancy of the Coalminers and the Potential for United 
Act 1 on
he willingness of the coalminers to take action in defence
f tneir gobs was made clear when 75% of NUM membership 
responded positively to the strike call and brought 80% of 
the country’s coal production to a halt. Faced with the 
prospect of lifelong unemployment the miners have understood 
their strike as a life and death struggle for the right to 
work. The low eob of worker militancy in the late 1870’s in 
Britain gave way to an increasing confidence during the 
massive strikes of the steelworkers {1988} and the 
printworkers (1983). This has reached a climax in the 
determination of the striking miners not to back down. Tens 
of thousands of workers have been involved in picketing 
daily with well-coordinated movement of "flying pickets" to 
blockade still-operating mines.
On the spontaneous level there h3S been extensive solidarity 
with the striking miners - regional solidarity strikes by 
workers in Wales, a solidarity strike by bus and train 
drivers and blacking action by transport workers. The use cf 
non-union dockworkers to load blacked coal triggered off a 
massive dockworkers’ strike in July. Although it was 
Shortlived it indicated the potential for the struggle of 
the coalminers to become generalised and to fire workers in 
other industries with confidence to come out in their own 
defence. By the end cf June the miners had received R1J 
million in donations, the Bakers' Union was supplying their 
families with free bread and women in the mining communities 
had established support groups campaigning for material help 
and joining miners on the picket lines.
Support for the miners* struggle has extended beyond 
Britams* borders. Financial assistance has been forthcoming 
from workers in France, West Germany, New Zealand, Holland 
and the USSR and transport workers m  Belguin and Australia 
have refused to handle coal bound for Britain. .Host 
significant were the joint meetings between British strikers 
and West German metal and print workers who recently struck 
for a 35-hour working week where miners stressed the 
international nature of their defensive struggle.
Although the strike has been characterised by an 
unprecedented militancy and disparate expressions of 
workers' yearning for united action, this potential has 
remained largely directionless. Kith the momentum of the 
strike clearly on the wane it is crucial to examine the 
failure of the leadership to respond to the needs of the 
working class in this period.
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NL’H, TUG And The Labour Party
The failure of NG'M, TUC and the Labour Party to see the 
direct connection between the coalminers' strike and the 
life-and-death struggle of the British working class against 
Thatcherism and the economic crises is not altogetner 
surprising. In spite of the hue and cry from the traditional 
leadership of the labour movement against Thatcher's 
austerity measures, the unions and the Labour Party have 
buckled on fundamental principles of working class defence.
In 1983 the TOC, which represents 10 million industrial 
workers made it clear that it would not automatically 
support individual unions which flouted Thatcher's anti­
union laws. In practice this meant nothing less than the 
reactionary refusal to support; the militant pr intworkers' 
strike in 1983 after they had undertaken extensive "illegal" 
secondary picketing. This represented a major victory for 
Thatcherism and the thin end of the fascist wedge was firmly 
driven home.
The response of the TOC to the miners' strike has been one 
of routine loyalty. The lip-service support given to the 
strike at the Brighton TUC conference in September was not 
only hesitant, Dut was motivated more by opportunistic and 
bureaucratic concerns than out of any sense of urgency. With 
elections to the General Council of the TUC taking place 
there were complex power struggles and internal shifts that 
had to be considered and the best way of preventing 
polarisation within the TUC was to give official and 
moderate support to the strike. The TUC saw its support for 
the miners not as a means of generalising their struggle and 
advancing it organisationally, but with the hope of being 
able to exert a "moderating" influence on events and 
pressurise Scargill and the Coal Board into a compromise. A 
recent issue of the ECONOMIST claimed that TUC support was 
reluctant; on the one hand because it feared the 
embarrasraent of tne possible defeat of the strike, but on 
the other hand success would be even more damaging because 
"it would associate more of the trade union movement with 
tactics of industrial anarchy, and silence those who are 
trying to find the unions a sensible role."
Although individual union affiliates of TUC have been far 
bolder in actively supporting the miners through solidarity 
strikes and blacking action, this has been hesitant, 
desparate and inconsistent. The Steelworkers Union feared 
retrenchment of its members and so undertook no supportative 
action; although the Transport and General Workers Union 
pledged "total support" this committment was immediately 
broken by truckers transporting coal and the collapse of the 
dock strike. Once it was clear that a Naccd strike, which 
would nave closed all of the coal mines, had been averted, 
the coalminers' last hope lay with the electricity supply 
unions which have the power to black out the whole country
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overnight. The reluctance of their leadership to take 
decisive action was made clear by the vague committment 
offered by the General Secretary of the Power Engineers to 
meet NUM "sometime in the future" and his admission, “I 
cannot see what else the Coal Board could possibly concede."
The timid econo ir. ism of the majority of the trade unions 
found its twin in the reformist response of the Labour 
Party. The Labour Party has not begun to understand the 
intensification of the class struggle brought on by the 
economic crisis and anachronistical!y propogates the 
consensus politics between the government and the unions 
that Thatcher cast aside in 1P88. When Thatcher introduced 
the anti-union laws the Labour leadership responded with 
complete passivity. In their view tnis legislation was not a 
siqnificant turn towards a fascist repression of working 
class rights but an uncomplicated extension of the 
troublesome relationship between the unions and Conservative 
governments.
The Labour Party's solution to the problems facing Britain 
is a Labour government that would somehow ensure the 
"voluntary" restraint and co-operation of the unions. But 
any attempt to harmonise the conflict between capital and 
labour especially under conditions of economic crisis, where 
each can only defend itself at the expense of the other, 
will only mean a severe compromise of the interests of 
workers. This attempt to separate the problems facing the 
working class from the militant character of its struggle in 
tnis period was clearly expressed in Neil Kinnock's (leader 
of the Labour Parry; condemnation of the miners' violence, 
"violence distracts attention from tne central issues of the 
dispute. It obscures the justice of the miners' case." This 
comment is not far from Thatcher's "the rule of law must 
prevail over the tula of the mob."
:he
Despite the organisational potential that exists in Britain 
for the working class to generalise particular struggles, 
the defiance of Thatcher's anti-union laws by certain, unions 
has to a greater or lesser degree remained individualised. 
It is especially during this period of deep economic 
recession and brutal attacks on the living standards of 
workers that parochial action is doomed to failure. No' 
single union is able to defend itself agains 
determination of a ruling class in crisis.
icatg 1 1 i1 s c a n s  for support from other unions have acaii 
ret iected parochial interests. His call has been for othe 
unions simply to assist the coalminers and there has been ni 
attempt to connect their fate with the fate of the uv_i
? u  * r<?» v h V  *- v. .v. °a ? 1 ° i <■*•>«> « . « ! , * . ’ ( ‘i„.i ^a5>i=> or znexr own struggles. The obvoM-,
Of the1 °m i ner sSf i^e .r ^ retrerchren the■fac t that the'pligh' 
attack on their rights t ^ l " ^ # ■ « \he^l
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of all British workers and that their struggle for the right 
to work is the struggle of workers internationally.
Parochialism is inevitably economistic; that is, it does not 
establish the connection between the economic struggles of 
workers over wages, retrenchments etc. and the use of state 
power by the ruling class to ensure a high rate of profit. 
Thatcherism has made this connection hundreds of times by 
attacking the democratic rights of workers in their 
organisations and through the mobilisation of police to 
attack pickets in order precisely to force the working class 
to submit to more intensive exploitation.
Scargill, the much acclaimed "Red", has stated that 
“capitalism is obscene and needs to be overthrown". His bark 
is worse than his bite. His solution to the threat of the 
closure of "uneconomic" industries and thus to retrenchment 
shows no boldness,
“We need the immediate establishment of import controls, 
thus protecting our industry from outside unfair 
competition. The immediate introduction of import controls 
alongside subsidies similar to those applicable in Western 
Europe would enable this industry to embark on an 
expansionist programme, stop all pit closures, invest in 
existing collieries, develop new mines and at the same 
time use the enormous coal stocks currently dominating the 
skylines in Britain."
Scargiii's proposals reek of reformism. Only through a more 
intensive exploitation of mineworkers and the extraction of 
greater profits would the mining bosses be able to embark on 
an "expansionist programme”, "invest in existing collieries" 
and "develop new mines". Firstly, none of the measures 
proposed by Scargill, which were echoed by the TOC at their 
September conference, will be able to secure the jobs of the 
miners in the long term. Unemployment and retrenchment are 
inevitable features of a crisis-ridden capitalist economy. 
Secondly, the call for the protection of British industry 
and for import controls is irreconcilable with the need to 
build international solidarity amongst workers. 
Protectionism will merely foster and intensify a 
nationalistic spirit among British workers. From the 
leadership of the workers it is a reactionary call and 
reveals most starkly Scargiii's failure to link the 
coalminers' strike with the struggle of workers 
internationally against retrenchments and unemployment.
ONCE AGAIN - THE URGENT CALL
The meaning of the British coalminers' strike is clear - it 
has brought into the open the decisive conflict between the 
efforts of declining capitalism to maintain its profits and 
the struggle of the working class against increasing
immiseraticn. Over the last four years the Conservative 
Tnatcher government has embarked on a decisive and thorough­
going attack cn tne living standards and democratic rights 
of the British workers. The anti-union laws and brutal 
police action are the first indications that the state is 
resorting to fascist methods to carry out its monetarist 
policies. As of yet tne state has been neither forced nor 
able to make full use of its repressive armoury against tne 
working class, being cautious net to provoke workers over 
the heads of their heel-dragging leaders and making use of 
the parochial, opportunist and reformist traditions of the 
labour leadership to divide and dissipate united action.
It is cf crucial importance that the 3ritish working class 
begins to break with the bureaucratic tradition of its 
leadership. Neither SOM nor TUC nor the Labour Party has 
been acre to effectively defend the minewotkecs, and none of 
them, in tneir utterances and practices, have recognised the 
urgency of united defensive action as the only way of 
staving off the attacks of a desparate ruling class. The 
call from the British miners is not for a bureaucratic TUC 
alliance that issues formal declarations of protest against 
privatisation and unemployment, but for a United Front of 
all workers organisations - employed and unemployed, 
organised and unorganised - that can effectively halt the 
rising tide of fascism through united action. The call from 
the miners is not only for support for their own cause but 
for a general strike that would extend and broaden their 
struggle against retrenchment to diverse other workers' 
struggles. The call of the miners must become the more 
conscious call of the whole British working class - for a 
leadership that is able to read the signs of the times 
take up the defence of workers through united action.
an
Nicaragua in Perspective
"If we (the USA) interfere with the internal 
politics of countries within our orbit in order to 
prevent them from falling into the communist 
orbit, we must deny them the privilege of choosing 
their own form of government. Since under the 
present arrangements we are also denying them 
economic prosperity, we are obliged to rely on 
increasingly oppressive regimes in order to 
maintain our domination." (George Soros, New York 
fund manager, writing in FINANCIAL TIMES, 23.5.84)
In recent months the threat of an American invasion of 
Nicaragua has loomed large across the headlines. In the wake 
of massive United states intimidation of the Government of 
National Reconstruction by mining Nicaraguan ports and 
conducting military exercises in neighbouring Honduras, the 
US government has launched a far-reaching propaganda 
campaign to justify the possibility ef another brutal 
crushing of populist independence. But is the prospect of an 
American invasion the only threat to the gains of the 1979 
Sar.danista revolution? Nicaragua has not escaped world 
economic crisis. Its effects are mote and more forcing the 
contradictions inherent in the populist programme of 
"harmonising" class differences into the open. Discontent 
among workers in Nicaragua and the strengthening of the 
local bourgeoisie are opening up a new pnase of struggle 
which will be decisive for the fate of the Nicaraguan 
revolution.
AMERICAN CONTROL OF NICARAGUA
American control of Nicaragua goes back to the turn of the 
century. America's interest, was initially mainly strategic 
as control of Nicaragua meant control of the commercial 
shipping that passed through the Panama Canal. This 
strategic interest in Nicaragua changed significantly as 
America needed to extract raw materials and invest capital 
in Nicaragua in the face of falling profit in America 
itself. The former colonies of America now became mere areas 
of extraction, the basis of which was the super-exploitation 
of the cheap migrant and seasonal labour. This process of 
imperialist expansion led to impoverishment and 
underdevelopment in the areas controlled by the USA. In many 
cases capital investment and the extraction of raw materials 
required political control.
Before 19B9 American control was limited to ensuring that
the p o l i t i c a l  leaders elected to tbe government supported
American interests. Often these political leaders, mainly 
emerging plantation or agricultural capitalists, went 
counter to the interests or America.
In 1939 the Nicaraguan government attempted to get Germany 
and Japan to challenge American control of the Panama Canal. 
This infuriated the US government which, via American 
companies in Nicaragua, sponsored a conservative overthrow 
of the Nigaraguan government. The coup d’tat was successful, 
but there was no guarantee that the new leader and the 
government would secure American interests. The US Karines 
subsequently invaded Nicaragua and not only set up a 
government to ensure American control of the Panama Canal 
but also used this opportunity to take control over 
Nicaraguan factories and farms. It brought ail the 
Nicaraguan banks, customs departments, post offices, 
railways and harbours under US control.
The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie protested vehemently, organising 
a national uprising m  1912 against American control. This 
was simply an anti-colonial struggle led by an aspirant 
national bourgeoisie and had no anti-capitalist intentions. 
Following closely on the events of 1912 was another American 
invasion and military occupation of Nicaragua. In the 
ensuing twelve years of occupation ail anti-colonial 
opposition was brought to heel, the strong nationalist 
government was ousted and major concessions were granted to 
powerful American companies at the expense of the Nicaraguan 
bourgeoisie. 'When the US army occupation ended in i92S an 
open civil war broke out between opposing factions of the 
bourgeoisie (the pro-American liberals being overthrown bv 
conservatives nationalists, in which American arbitrated 
with force.
While the American imperialists "resolved*1 the crisis in 
bourgeois leadership more ominous forces entered the fray. 
The struggles of 1912-1925 had spawned an anti-American 
guerilla movement in Nicaragua. Support for it grew amongst 
the peasants and workers who had in some areas taken full 
control of the farms and factories. Under the leadership of 
Sandir.o, a Nicaraguan ex-army officer ana petty trader, tne 
guerilla movement aided by international pressure forced tne 
withdrawal of the US Marines in 1931.
The withdrawal did n*t mean an end to American control, it 
merely forced America to cnange its strategy. Already in 
1927, anticipating Che forced withdrawals of its troops, tne 
American army had created a Nicaraguan National Guard. The 
main purpose of the National Guard was to bring to power a 
dictatorial regime and to provide the main mechanism for 
American control. This plan was not confined to Nicaragua 
but had become America's strategy towards Latin America as a 
whole.
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In order to maintain severe exploitation of labour and 
access to cheap extraction of the raw materials and wealth, 
as well as to restrict resistance and pressure from the 
impoverished masses, the US government was forced to create 
strong dictatorial governments backed by a US controlled 
army. These dictatorial governments- were set up in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Bolivia and the 
Dominican Republic.
1936 saw the materialisation of the purpose for which tne 
National Guard had been set up in 1927. A dictatorship was 
established in Nicaragua under the auspices of tne chief of 
the National Guard, Samoza, and was to last for 50 years. It 
ushered in half a century of the most severe exploitation 
and oppression for the benefit of tne predatory American 
economy.
However, it was not only the military might of the USA which 
ushered in great hardship for the Nicaraguan workers and 
peasants but, importantly, the fact that the petty-baurgecis 
led guerilla movement capitulated militarily and politically 
to tne Nicaraguan government in a bid to settle tne future 
of their war-torn country. As a signal warning of the 
betrayal of the interests of the workers and peasants who 
had courageously driven the Americans out, Sandino was 
assassinated, many of the guerillas were murdered and 
workers and peasants were brutally repressed. With the 
peasants' and workers' opposition to American imperialism 
smashed, the path was cleared for Samoza, xn collusion with 
sections of his family and the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, to 
amass great wealth.
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN NICARAGUA
In the 1958's and 1960's Nicaragua became a f u 11 y.-f ledged 
but weak capitalist country. This was made possible by the 
expropriation of the land and large-scale proletarianisation 
of peasants. The revolts which accompanied these 
developments were crushed by the National Guard. The main 
'areas of capitalist growth were in light industry, textiles, 
chemicals, metal and food processing. Cotton became the m a m  
export overtaking coffee, livestock and sugar. Nicaragua 
remained essentially an extractive economy controlled by 
foreign companies and by the local bourgeoisie. This legacy 
from her pre-capitalist days made Nicaragua dependent on 
loans from the world Bank to prop up her lop-sided economic 
development, and all the evils of a backward economy were 
visited upon her with the onset of tr.e world economic crisis 
in the early 78's. Between 1969 and 1974 3 7^ of the
Nicaraguan factories closed. Foreign dent rose from 225 
million to a 1038 million dollars. Foreign investment took 
flight. Nicaraguan economy was in a severe crises.
Resistance to the Samoza government grew as the economic 
crises saw wages plummet ana unemployment soar. The local
bourgeoisie was also forced into an anti-Samoza stance 
because the dictatorship could not ensure stable conditions 
for exploitation. The Saitoza family was openly corrupt. It 
appropriated earth-quake relief funds to invest in their own 
companies. The stage was set for another wave of popular 
resistance.
THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE TAKES THS LEAD IN' THE STRUGGLE
By 1973 disenchantment witn the Samoza regime expressed 
itself in the fact that the National Guard was the only 
support for the American backed dictator and the meaning of 
this loyalty became abundantly clear when they summoned all 
forces to force workers participating in tne National 
General Strike, called by tne bourgeoisie, to go back to 
work.
3ut the progressiveness of the bourgeoisie was short-lived 
as events that followed exposed their class allegiances. 
Panic overtook them as workers and peasants took to open 
combat in the streets to defend themselves against the 
National Guard. They turned away from the workers and 
peasants and appealed to their one time enemy, America, to 
get rid cf Samoza. America did not respond because it had 
met with resounding defeat in Vietnam and public opinion was 
intensely opposed to American intervention in ocuer 
countries. The bourgeoisie lost support decisively to the 
petty-bcucgeoisie led FSLN when they called off thestrike 
and opened the factories and the farms. Carter's hesitancy 
to support Samoza cr to maintain American control by 
supporting the opposition bourgeoisie allowed the rSIN to 
consolidate and build support for a more far-reaching change 
and intensification of the struggle.
THE HISTORY OF THE FSLN AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE SAMOZA 
DICTATORSHIP
The FSLN had no mass support up to the early seventies, its 
composition dominated by intellectuals who hotly debated the 
issue of the nature of the Nicaraguan struggle. By 1973, 
their position had defined itself much more clearly with 2 
major expulsions from their ranks. The first was a 
proletarian tendency which eschewed military adventurism and 
urged solid roots to ce sunk in the working class. The 
second was a tendency which argued that the Nicaraguan 
revolution should unfold like Vietnam.
The FSLN majority known as the Tercerista tendency based 
their understanding of struggle on the 2 stage theory. The 
first stage being the completion of bourgeois democracy via 
the national liberation struggle. This struggle should be 
led by an alliance of all classes, and not by tne 
bourgeoisie a’s in tne classical two stage theory because 
they were too weak politically ana were far too tied to
merely become junior partners in the world capitalist 
system.
This lea the FSLN majority to adopt the populist strategy o£ 
struggle which in reality is in fact a 2 stage struggle led 
by the middle class. The FSLN1s strategy involved an 
alliance of all classes in Nicaragua. These classes via 
their organisations would join together to form a people’s 
alliance, where no particular class dominates, but where the 
alliance attempts to represent the interests of ail classes. 
Via the people's struggle for national lioeration the first 
stage could be completed.
The second stage, the socialist stage was not defined by the 
FSLN. It was merely stated as ceing a long term goal. This 
tendency’s strategy therefore combined commando-type action 
and urban guerilla activities as well as mobilizing support 
amongst all classes, but more especially the working class 
and peasantry who were the largest and potentially the most 
militant. The FSLN’s immediate goal was to organise an 
alliance of all classes in preparation for a national 
uprising.
The FSLN’s majority motto was ironically "Only the workers 
and peasants will go all the way. Only their organising 
force will achieve victory". Certainly, the FSLN realized 
that the people’s revolution could only succeed by the use 
of the combined strength of the workers and peasants. These 
classes were mobilized and organised into defence committees 
on the eve of the revolution and became the main forces in 
the revolution. Yet the political programme of the FSLN and 
later the united Peoples Movement (lea by the FSLN) was not 
guided by an understanding of the signal importance of the 
working class in leading the struggle against American 
exploitation and oppression. In no way could the FSLN 
consistently represent and fight in the interest of the 
working class and peasantry as this would alienate the 
other classes, thus undermining the basis of the FSL.N's 
struggle. This was directly reflected in the FSLN's 
programme.
The FSLN insists up until today that their political 
programme is a Nicaraguan one that grew out of the 
conditions of struggle in Nicaragua. The basis of the 
struggle being anti-imperialist, anti-dictatorial and 
popular. Their programme involved mobilizing the masses on 
the basis of strong nationalist feelings against Samoza and 
the United States. Taking advantage of the broad range of 
opposition to Samoza they incorporated into their programme 
general democratic demands around which all classes - 
capitalists, middle class, peasants and workers - could 
rally.
The FSLN stretched its net even wider in the wake of the
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organisations under its o a p. n e r in the United Peoples 
Movement. Inis Movement even included the anti-Samoza 
Bourgeoisie whose Broad Opposition Front had split apart 
leaving the class divided and politically weak. Having drawn 
together all anti-American forces into one multi class 
conglomerate the united Peoples Movement nad only to come to 
power to give realisation to its populist programme. After a 
brutal struggle the United Peoples Movement overthrew Samoza 
in 1979 and established the government of National 
Reconstruction.
THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
The Government of National Reconstruction, or Junta, led by 
the FSLH dominated United Peoples Movement, set itself the 
task of rebuilding Nicaragua economically, politically and 
socially. The political form of its rule was to be “popular 
democracy", or "people's" power, and pluralism {the right of 
all political parties to exist irrespective of their class 
base). The Junta, in which local capitalists, the church, 
the trade unions, student organisations and the FSLN had 
representation embarked on the first stage of national 
reconstruction - tne completion of capitalist development 
under the guidance of "peoples" power.
Setting out its objectives a spokesman for the Junta stated, 
"It is a question of bringing together wage workers with 
small producers and artisans, with professionals and 
technicians in a single unbreakaoie project of National 
Unity. It also means integrating the patriotic businessmen 
and offering tnese people the support of the government 
necessary to reactivate tneir sector of the economy in order 
to achieve the goals in production which this plan has set 
for the private sector." Rather than base itself on the 
power of the exploited, "The government of National Unity 
expresses the common interests of her nation of Nicaragua in 
cue face of external and internal limitations imposed by our 
history and our plan. Accordingly we recognise the 
differences that exist in our society as well as the right 
of the government to harmonise these differences between 
various interest groups, through its leadership and in 
alliance with others, in order to attain a system of unity, 
liberty and social justice." The Junta oeiieved that 
alongside exploitation and the private ownership of the 
productive forces a 'peoples' democracy could be achieved if 
the interests of the different classes could oe harmonised 
and directed to benefit the Nicaraguan revolution.
The Junta has succeeded in bringing about massive economic, 
social and political changes. For example thousands of 
people have been housed and educated - the illiteracy rate 
was lowered from 50,31 to 12,9%. Rents, transport fares, 
food prices have ail been drastically lowered. Medical 
facilities have improved in quantity and quality and 
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suf letea chc *ot$t .unde: ii.'oza are enjoying a relatively 
f:gh quality of lisa. Basic democratic rights have been 
ex aaded; the right to join trade unions and other 
organisations, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
womens rights etc..
Certainly on a social benefit or welfare level the Junta has 
ensured that the peasants and workers benefit, even at the 
expense of the middle and capitalist class. However the 
relations of production appear, after nearly 4 years, to be 
capitalist. The capitalists in Nicaragua own about Stfi of 
the agriculture, 75% of the industry and 75% of the other 
otoduction processes, with the state owning and 
-.ationalicing approximately 75* in each sector.
The policy towards the bourgeoisie remains one of 
conciliation and restricted development. They still exploit 
supposedly "under the most democratic form". They still own 
and control most of the wealth in Nicaragua "in the interest 
of the Nicaraguan revolution". Jaime Wheelock, a present 
government member, spells out the role of the bourgeoisie, 
"there exists the possibility that the bourgeoisie only 
produce without power, that it limit itself as a class to a 
productive role, that is, that it limit itself to exploiting 
it's means of production and that it utilize those means of 
production t : live n nt as instruments of power, cf 
imposition."
Simply what the people's government is saying is that the 
bourgeoisie must develop to it’s fullest potential, must 
continue to exploit the large working class. This the 
people's government will only allow if the bourgeoisie does 
not undermine or attempt to sabotage the aims of the 
revolution. To prevent them from doing tnis the bourgeoisie 
is not allowed to wield any political power. If they do not 
produce and exploit the workers "well", in accordance with 
the conditions set by the people's government the 
capitalist's factories or farms are immediately nationalised 
by the peoples government. This policy has kept many of the 
remaining bourgeoisie in check. As far as the exploited are 
concerned the Junta claims that "the working class must be 
truly converted into a working class with its specific 
interest." According to the first stage of the revolution 
the working class is to mature as a social force and flex 
its muscles through its trade unions in preparation for the 
second or "socialist" stage.
The "socialist" aims of the Junta are however highly 
questionable. Increasingly reluctant to antagonise the 
bourgeoisie, one Junta spokesman asserted, "it can be very 
simple to transform the social structure without always 
having to resort to the expropriation of the means of production
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Already class conflict is beginning to intensify and the 
Junta is being forced to straddei more and more 
contradictions. Unemployment is still a major soure of 
dissatisfaction and there have been an increasing number of 
strikes especially since the dramatic price increases of 
late 1933. Ac the same time the capitalists are 
straightening their hold over the economy and foreign 
companies and banks, although under severe restrictions, are 
still operating extensively.
As so-called "popular anti-imper 1a1ist" struggles in ocher 
countries have shown (even on Nicaragua's doorstep) a pecic 
bourgeois led people's government has little chance of 
long term stability m  the epoch of declining capitalism. As 
is already happening in Nicaragua the economic crisis is 
driving wedges into the cherished national unity. Workers 
are being forced more and more to shoulder the burden of 
rising prices and unemployment “in the name of the 
revolution." Whatever intentions the F3LN may have to usher- 
in a second "socialist" stage they are effectively cutting 
the ground from under the feet of the only class that can 
fulfil? that task, the exploited working class. By actively 
obscuring the-independent interests of the working class for 
the sake of national unity and by nurturing a national 
bourgeoisie with its imperialist connections it is more 
likely to give way to bourgeois political rule and a 
backtracking on the gains of the 1979 revolutions than to 
usher in any second stage. This defeat is less likely to 
simply unfold organically than to be thrust forcefully onto 
Nicaragua through a Granada-style American invasion.
The Nicaraguan working class must look beyond the leadership 
of the Junta government and must begin to exert its 
independent class strength through the ATC (Rural Workers 
Association) and the trade unions. Against the growing 
strength of the bourgeoisie the working class must struggle 
to defend and extend the gains of the revolution and take it 
beyond the bounds offered by the populist middle class. Its 
struggle against American imperialism is not a peculiar 
Nicaraguan national struggle but a task tnat can only be 
carried out through regional and international 
worker solidarity.
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UNITED FRONT SONG (BERTOLT BRECHT)
And because a man is human 
He'll want to eat, and thanks a lot 
3ut talk can't take the place of meat 
Or fill an empty pot.
So left, two, three
So left, two, three
Comrade, there’s a place for you
Take a stand in the workers' united front
For you are a worker too.
And because a man is human
He won't care for a kick in the face.
He doesn't want slaves under him 
Or above him a ruling class.
So left, two, three
So left, two, three
Comrade, there's a place for you
Take your stand in the worker's united front
For you are a worker too.
And because a worker's a worker 
No one else will bring him liberty.
It's nobody's work out the worker's own 
To set the worker free.
So left, two, three,
So left, two, three,
Comrade, there's a place for you.
T3ke your stand in the worker's united front 
For you are a worker too.
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